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Down the Drain: How North Carolina Municipalities Lost
Immunity for Storm Drains in Jennings v. Fayetteville*
INTRODUCTION
When a high school student falls into a city-owned drainage
ditch, will the city's prospects of facing expensive wrongful death
litigation hinge on the origin of the water in the ditch? If this scenario
happens in North Carolina, the answer might be yes. As the law
currently stands after the North Carolina Court of Appeals case
Jennings v. City of Fayetteville,' if the ditch carried storm water, the
municipality will likely face liability-certainly an unappealing
prospect in this time of tightened budgets.2 On the other hand, if the
ditch carried sewage water, the municipality will likely be immune
from the wrongful death claim. In addition to the real-world
implications for injured parties and cash-strapped municipalities, this
seemingly arbitrary distinction between sewers and storm drains
reveals the confusing nature of North Carolina law on government
immunity.
In Jennings, the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that the
City of Fayetteville did not enjoy governmental immunity for a
wrongful death claim resulting from the city's operation of storm
drains.' In August 2005, Jesse Marquil King, a senior at Terry Sanford
High School, drowned during a rainstorm in Fayetteville when he
attempted to cross a flooded area near Spruce Street and was dragged
underwater.4 In Jennings, the Court relied heavily upon the 1996 case
of Kizer v. City of Raleigh,5 where the court of appeals claimed to
* © 2010 Trent McCotter.
1. __ N.C. App. -, 680 S.E.2d 757, discretionary review denied, 363 N.C. 654,.684
S.E.2d 891 (2009).
2. See NAT'L GOVERNORS ASS'N & NAT'L ASS'N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS,
THE FISCAL SURVEY OF STATES, at viii-1 (2009), available at http://www.nga.org/Filesl
pdfIFSS0906.pdf (noting that forty-two states' expected revenues were below target in
2009 and that forty-three states reduced budgetary spending); Brian Winter, States
Struggling with EPA Rules, USA TODAY, Feb. 3, 2010, at 1A (noting that forty-eight
states have cut their budget allowances for dealing with environmental clean-up
regulations, many of which are promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency).
3. Jennings, - N.C. App. at __, 680 S.E.2d at 760.
4. Family Can Sue City Over Drowning, FAYETTEVILLE OBSERVER, Aug. 5, 2009, at
3B.
5. 121 N.C. App. 526,466 S.E.2d 336 (1996).
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have reviewed the applicable precedent and then broadly concluded
that "storm drain maintenance does not enjoy governmental
immunity."6
The Jennings decision has now exposed municipalities to liability
for operating storm drains, despite numerous reasons for concluding
that such activity should be immune from lawsuit. This Recent
Development concludes that operating storm drains should be
considered a "governmental" function-and thus afforded immunity
for personal injury damages.7 Part I gives a brief history of
government immunity over the last several hundred years. Part II lists
several reasons why municipalities should enjoy immunity for their
maintenance of storm drains, including precedent from the Supreme
Court of North Carolina, the extensive regulation of storm drains by
the State of North Carolina, and the similarities between storm drains
and sewers. Part III shows that precedent also bars recovery for
personal injury resulting from storm drains and sewers, even though
the courts have historically allowed recovery for property damages.
Part IV argues that the failure to shield storm drains from liability
forces municipalities to choose between costly renovations of their
storm drains and paying for the inevitable lawsuits directly or through
liability insurance.
I. THE DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The doctrine of sovereign immunity traces its origins in Western
law to the idea that the king made the laws, and thus "anything the
king did was perforce legal."8 Therefore, there could be no valid suit
against the sovereign. The doctrine made its way to the United States
in the early 1800s9 and was soon adopted by nearly every state.10
6. Id. at 529, 466 S.E.2d at 338.
7. See infra Part III for a discussion of the historical allowance for recovery of
damages to property.
8. DONALD L. DOERNBERG, SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY OR THE RULE OF LAW: THE
NEW FEDERALISM'S CHOICE 3 (2005). This concept originally gained legitimacy from the
belief of rex gratia dei, which states that the king is in power by the grace of God. LEON
HURWITZ, THE STATE AS DEFENDANT: GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE
REDRESS OF INDIVIDUAL GRIEVANCES 10 (1981).
9. See Mower v. Inhabitants of Leicester, 9 Mass. (8 Tyng) 247, 250 (1812) (citing
Russell v. The Men of Devon, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788)).
10. See 1 CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: ITS
DIVISIONS, AGENCIES AND OFFICERS § 1.1, at 6-10 (Jon L. Craig ed., 2002) (listing forty-
four states with cases holding that a "state may not be sued in its own courts without its
consent"). In Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907), Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes claimed that the "sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal
conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no
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However, the enjoyment of sovereign immunity is limited to
government bodies that are truly "sovereign," namely the United
States federal government and each state government." Excluded
from the doctrine are cities and municipalities, which are considered
"mere creature[s] of the Legislature ... [and which have] no inherent
power and ... must exercise delegated power strictly within the
limitations prescribed by the Legislature."'" As such, by default,
municipalities are liable for their actions unless shielded by the state.3
In North Carolina, municipalities can still enjoy limited
governmental immunity for actions considered to be "governmental,"
as opposed to "proprietary" functions for which the municipality will
face liability in the event of negligence.t " The distinction is that a
municipality, which has features of both a corporation and a
sovereign government, 5 will not be liable for governmental acts that
it carries out on behalf of the state but will be liable for proprietary
acts, which are more akin to activities undertaken by a private
business. 6 For instance, the construction of a county prison was
legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends." Id.
One scholar has argued that sovereign immunity is actually a "profanation" of the
Constitution because it creates a government that is not answerable to its own citizens. See
DOERNBERG, supra note 8, passim.
11. See 1 CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, supra note
10, § 1.1, at 6-10.
12. State v. Scoggin, 236 N.C. 1, 8, 72 S.E.2d 97, 102 (1952).
13. Hillsborough v. Smith, 10 N.C. App. 70, 73, 178 S.E.2d 18, 21 (1970) ("A
municipal corporation may not waive or contract away its governmental immunity in the
absence of legislative authority for such action.").
14. Evans v. Hous. Auth., 359 N.C. 50, 53, 602 S.E.2d 668, 670 (2004) ("Under the
doctrine of sovereign immunity, the State is immune from suit absent waiver of immunity.
Under the doctrine of governmental immunity, a county is immune from suit for the
negligence of its employees in the exercise of governmental functions absent waiver of
immunity. These immunities do not apply uniformly. The State's sovereign immunity
applies to both its governmental and proprietary functions, while the more limited
governmental immunity covers only the acts of a municipality or a municipal corporation
committed pursuant to its governmental functions.") (internal citations omitted).
15. See Town of Grimesland v. City of Washington, 234 N.C. 117, 123, 66 S.E.2d 794,
798 (1951).
16. Interestingly, the first North Carolina case dealing with this topic held that
municipalities would enjoy liability for doing the state's work only so long as the
municipality does the work "in a skilful and proper manner," and that, if "the work be not
done with ordinary skill and caution, the corporation has not acted in pursuance of the
power vested in it" and would be liable to suit as would any individual person. Meares v.
City of Wilmington, 31 N.C. (9 Ired.) 73, 81 (1848). That is, if the municipality was
negligent, it specifically would not enjoy immunity. Later, the rule was expanded to
examine whether the municipality acted in good faith, rather than whether its work was
performed in a skillful manner: "A municipal corporation is not liable to an action for
damages either for the non-exercise of, or for the manner in which in good faith, it
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determined to be governmental,17 while the building and maintenance
of a golf course by a municipality was held to be a proprietary act.18
The line between governmental and proprietary actions can, however,
be difficult to determine, particularly when the activity in question,
while typically within the domain of the government, is also
occasionally undertaken by private businesses.19
II. OPERATING STORM DRAINS IS A GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION
There are a number of reasons why Fayetteville's operation of
the storm drains in Jennings should have been considered a
governmental function and thus immune from suit. First, precedent
from the Supreme Court of North Carolina gives definitions of
governmental functions that should encompass the operation of storm
drains. Second, the extensive regulation of storm drains by the state
makes operating the drains an activity performed on behalf of the
state. Third, storm drains' similarities to sewers point toward labeling
the maintenance of storm drains a governmental function. Fourth,
North Carolina precedent regarding the definition of proprietary
activities also excludes the operation of storm drains.
A. Supreme Court Precedent
In 1909, the Supreme Court of North Carolina articulated the
following test for deciding whether a municipal action can face
liability: "When cities are acting in their corporate capacity or in the
exercises discretionary powers of a public or legislative character." Hill v. City of
Charlotte, 72 N.C. 55, 57 (1875).
17. Hayes v. Billings, 240 N.C. 78, 80, 81 S.E.2d 150, 152 (1954). Also held to be
governmental was installing and maintaining traffic signals, Hamilton v. Town of Hamlet,
238 N.C. 741, 742, 78 S.E.2d 770, 771-72 (1953), and providing water to extinguish fires,
Howland v. City of Asheville, 174 N.C. 749, 751, 94 S.E. 524, 524 (1917).
18. Lowe v. City of Gastonia, 211 N.C. 564, 566, 191 S.E. 7, 8 (1937). Building an
airport was also held to be proprietary, Rhodes v. City of Asheville, 230 N.C. 134, 141, 52
S.E.2d 371, 376 (1949), as was operating an electrical plant for profit, Rice v. City of
Lumberton, 235 N.C. 227, 236, 69 S.E.2d 543, 550 (1952). See infra Part II.A for
descriptions of various examples of government functions.
19. In 1991, the court of appeals lamented:
Drawing the line between municipal operations which are proprietary and subject
to tort liability versus operations which are governmental and immune from such
liability is a difficult task. The application of the [governmental-proprietary
distinctionI to given factual situations has resulted in irreconcilable splits of
authority and confusion as to what functions are governmental and what functions
are proprietary.
Pulliam v. City of Greensboro, 103 N.C. App. 748, 751, 407 S.E.2d 567, 568 (1991)
(alteration in original) (citation omitted).
2010] 2275
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
exercise of powers for their own advantage, they are liable for
damages caused by the negligence or torts of their officers or
agents., 21 On the other hand, when "they are exercising the judicial,
discretionary, or legislative authority conferred by their charters, or
are discharging the duty imposed solely for the public benefit," they
are immune from suit, unless the state specifically withholds such
immunity.21 In the 1952 case of Britt v. City of Wilmington,2 the
Supreme Court of North Carolina added that "the distinction is this:
If the undertaking of the municipality is one in which only a
governmental agency could engage, it is governmental in nature. It is
proprietary and 'private' when any corporation, individual, or group
of individuals could do the same thing.1
2 3
However, in 1975, the court backtracked somewhat from the idea
that a governmental function included only those services that no
private entity could possibly engage in. In Sides v. Cabarrus Memorial
Hospital, Inc.,24 the court held that "it appears that all of the activities
held to be governmental functions by this Court are those historically
performed by the government, and which are not ordinarily engaged in
by private corporations. 25
The operation of storm drains fits nicely within the Supreme
Court of North Carolina's precedents described above. The large
areas of land covered by drainage systems and the likelihood of
placing the pipes on private property dictate that storm drain
construction and maintenance is something that only a governmental
agency could successfully provide on any systematic basis. 26 One need
only look at New York City, which built its first storm drains in 1849,
expanded them to over 7,400 miles of pipes, and has been using them
ever since. 27 The sheer number of drainage systems run by
20. Metz v. City of Asheville, 150 N.C. 748, 749, 64 S.E. 881, 882 (1909).
21. Id.
22. 236 N.C. 446, 73 S.E.2d 289 (1952).
23. Id. at 450-51, 73 S.E.2d at 293.
24. 287 N.C. 14, 213 S.E.2d 297 (1975).
25. Id. at 23, 213 S.E.2d at 303 (emphasis added).
26. See Larry W. Mays, Introduction to STORMWATER COLLECIION SYSTEMS
DESIGN HANDBOOK § 1.3 (Larry W. Mays ed., 2001) (noting that typical drainage systems
are a mass of interconnected systems of gutters, culverts, drains, streets, streams,
floodways, detention ponds, and pipes used to carry rain and snowmelt to treatment plants
or receiving waters); Charles Duhigg, Sewers at Capacity, Waste Poisons Waterways, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 23, 2009, at A18 (noting that New York City alone has over 7,400 miles of
storm drain pipes and that the only way to reduce environmentally damaging run-off from
entering waterways is for the city to use its zoning powers to require private developers to
reconfigure their development plans).
27. Duhigg, supra note 26.
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municipalities-over 25,000-is certainly evidence of the extent to
which cities have come to dominate the drainage landscape.28
Sides also introduced an important second element to the
immunity test: governmental functions tend to be those that are not
"ordinarily engaged in by private corporations. '29 Certainly, private
individuals and businesses could construct and maintain their own
limited storm drains contained entirely on their own property,30 but
that alone should not preclude a classification of storm drains as a
governmental function.31 If it could, then sewers would not be
governmental either, as private citizens can install septic tanks and
thus create their own waste removal systems. That most storm drains,
like sewers, tend to flow into municipality-controlled central systems
is strong evidence that private corporations themselves do not
ordinarily engage in storm drain construction and maintenance, but
rather just funnel storm water into the municipalities' systems.32 Thus,
under either the Britt or the Sides definition of a governmental
function, the operation of storm drains qualifies as governmental
because it is a service that only a governmental agency could
adequately provide and, as discussed above, governmental agencies
have historically provided such services.
Accordingly, North Carolina "courts have concluded that when
municipalities engage in activities to clean up the municipality or to
collect trash, junk, or other waste, they are engaging in governmental
functions."33 Since "stormwater collects and flows over pavements,
lawns, driveways, and other urban surfaces ... [and] often picks up
considerable quantities of pollutants, such as oil and grease,
fertilizers, pesticides, and metals,"34 municipalities are performing a
governmental function by providing storm drains to collect and
28. See id.
29. Sides, 287 N.C. at 23, 213 S.E.2d at 303 (emphasis added).
30. See, e.g., Asheville Sports Prop., L.L.C. v. City of Asheville, - N.C. App. -,
__ 683 S.E.2d 217, 218-19 (2009) (noting that the plaintiff owned property where the
previous owner had installed large drain pipes that ultimately failed and caused plaintiff's
parking lot to cave in).
31. See Hewett v. County of Brunswick, __ N.C. App .... 681 S.E.2d 531, 535
(2009) (holding that the county was performing a governmental service even though the
same junk-removal service was supplied extensively by private entities).
32. See Mays, supra note 26, § 1.3.
33. Hewett,__ N.C. App. at -_, 681 S.E.2d at 535.
34. Roy D. Dodson & Craig D. Maske, Regulation of Stormwater Collection Systems
in the United States, in STORMWATER COLLECTION SYSTEMS DESIGN HANDBOOK § 2.1
(Larry W. Mays ed., 2001).
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transport dangerous chemicals and toxins away from our roads and
property to treatment plants.35
On the other hand, there is an argument that since municipalities
are not liable for damages resulting from their failure to install storm
drains,36 such drains are not so essential to the functioning of a city
that they can be defined as a governmental function. Refuting this,
however, the North Carolina General Statutes include the operation
of storm drains as a "public enterprise," 7 listing it among the most
important services that a municipality can provide for its citizens.38 As
such, the state has given municipalities very wide latitude to regulate,
create, and maintain their public enterprises.39 Given the purpose of
storm drains and the fact that they tend to have been historically
operated by municipalities, there is considerable support for the
argument that the operation of storm drains is best qualified as a
governmental function for which municipalities should enjoy
immunity.
B. Extensive Regulation by the State
Another reason why the operation of storm drains should be
considered a governmental function is that they are mandated and
extensively regulated by the state in accordance with the federal
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), which hands out fines
35. Hewett,__ N.C. App. at -, 681 S.E.2d at 535.
36. See Martinez v. Cook, 244 P.2d 134, 140 (N.M. 1952) ("It seems to be a settled
principle of law that the establishment of a drain by a municipal corporation is the exercise
of a legislative or quasi-judicial power, and the legislative body of the municipality is the
sole judge of the necessity therefor."); City of Mobile v. Jackson, 474 So. 2d 644, 649 (Ala.
1985) (holding that storm drains are not so essential to citizens that municipalities should
enjoy immunity)
37. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160a-311(10) (2009).
38. Id. § 160a-311(1)-(9) (defining "public enterprises" to include providing
electricity, water, sewers, gas, public transportation, garbage removal, cable television,
parking facilities, and airports).
39. Id. § 160a-312(a)-(b). Additionally, there are practical reasons why municipalities
should not be liable for failure to install storm drains: given the huge amount of land over
which storm water will run off and collect, municipalities could have hundreds or
thousands of locations where a storm drain is not currently installed but would help reduce
flooding. If municipalities had to install drain systems in all of these locations, the cost
would likely be prohibitive. For instance, New York City has a size of just 303 square
miles, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, NEW YORK (CITY) QUICKFACrS FROM THE U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/36/3651000.html (last visited Aug. 24,
2010), but it is estimated that the city would have to spend $58 billion to build enough
storm drains to prevent all run-off from ever overflowing into nearby water sources,
Duhigg, supra note 26. Philadelphia has announced that it will spend $1.6 billion over the
next twenty years in order to build "rain gardens and sidewalks of porous pavement and to
plant thousands of trees" to help reduce storm water run-off. Id.
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for storm drain overflows and requires that drains be built so that
they do not easily become clogged." The Supreme Court of North
Carolina has stated that "[any activity of the municipality which is
discretionary, political, legislative or public in nature and performed
for the public good in behalf of the State, rather than for itself, comes
within the class of governmental functions."41
Designed to help reduce pollutant discharges by storm water
systems, the National Storm Water Program ("NSW Program") is "a
federal government initiative, directed by the [EPA], with the
voluntary cooperation of authorized states and mandatory
participation of many local government agencies."4" Importantly, the
"EPA must approve a state's request to operate the [NSW Program]
once the EPA determines that the state has adequate legal
authorities, procedures, and the ability to administer the program."43
Once North Carolina gained approval in 1975 to participate in the
NSW Program,' the state legislature implemented many of the EPA
guidelines for storm drains,45 which means that all applications
submitted by municipalities must now be approved by the North
Carolina Environmental Management Commission.46 As such, the
program is run at the directive of the state.
While the NSW Program is directed by the state, it is funded and
operated largely by the municipalities themselves. "When Congress
enacted the ... program, it did not provide the states with funding to
support these comprehensive storm water management programs.
47
States essentially hand off the responsibility of complying with the
NSW Program to municipalities and other local governmental
40. Duhigg, supra note 26.
41. Millar v. Town of Wilson, 222 N.C. 340, 341, 23 S.E.2d 42, 43 (1942) (emphasis
added).
42. Dodson & Maske, supra note 34, § 2.3.
43. Id. § 2.4.1.
44. See Smith Chapel Baptist Church v. City of Durham, 350 N.C. 805, 808, 517 S.E.2d
874, 876 (1999).
45. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-214.7(c) (2009) ("The [North Carolina Environmental
Management] Commission shall develop model storm water management programs that
may be implemented by State agencies and units of local government. Model storm water
management programs shall be developed to protect existing water uses and assure
compliance with water quality standards and classifications.").
46. § 143-214.7(d) ("The [North Carolina Environmental Management] Commission
shall review each stormwater management program submitted by a State agency or unit of
local government .... The Commission shall approve a program only if it finds that the
standards of the program equal or exceed those of the model program adopted by the
Commission pursuant to this section.").
47. See Smith Chapel, 350 N.C. at 808,517 S.E.2d at 877.
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agencies, which must pay for them by charging fees and taxes.48
Therefore, municipalities are performing the state's work of
complying with the NSW Program; in other words, the municipalities
are performing an activity which is "public in nature and performed
for the public good in behalf of the State, rather than for itself. 49
This situation is of growing concern to municipalities, as an
increasing number of local governments have been caught up in the
dragnet of the NSW Program. 0 Beginning in March 2003, the NSW
Program guidelines applied to all population centers within those
states that had been approved by the EPA to participate in the NSW
Program.5' Any population center of at least 10,000 people with a
density of at least 1,000 people per square mile is included in the
NSW Program. 2 One study estimated that these guidelines will
require "several thousand additional municipal permits to be issued,"
and that most of these dischargers will be "small local government
agencies with limited technical resources. 53
Among the duties now required of such municipalities are (1)
obtaining permits for discharges from their own storm water
systems,54 (2) obtaining permits for any industrial or construction sites
operated by the municipality, 5 and (3) keeping records and
performing inspections of all storm water systems. 56 These
requirements are not just perfunctory. Any local government that
negligently fails to follow the EPA guidelines can face administrative
fines ranging from $2,500 to $25,000 per day. 7 The EPA also has
authority to file civil actions in district court.58 Falsifying or
withholding information from the EPA can result in imprisonment
for up to three years and a fine of up to $50,000 per day.59 Prison
sentences and cash penalties are doubled for repeat offenders.'
48. Duhigg, supra note 26; see infra Part II.D.
49. Millar v. Town of Wilson, 222 N.C. 340, 341, 23 S.E.2d 42, 43 (1942).
50. See Dodson & Maske, supra note 34, § 2.3.
51. Id.
52. 40 C.F.R. § 122.32(d) (2009); 40 C.F.R. § 123.35(b)(2) (2009).
53. Dodson & Maske, supra note 34, § 2.4.2.
54. Id. Not all discharges are considered illicit, but anything not specifically allowed is
considered to be illicit. Allowable discharges include, inter alia, such seemingly trivial
items as air conditioner condensation, lawn watering, water discharges from extinguishing
fires, and unavoidable rising groundwater. Id. §§ 2.6-2.7.
55. Id. § 2.4.2.
56. Id.
57. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)(B) (2006).
58. § 1319(b).
59. § 1319(c)(2)(B).
60. Id.; § 1319(c)(1)(B).
[Vol. 882280
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Considering that so many local government entities now have to
bring their storm drain systems up to code and report to the state of
North Carolina under penalty of severe civil and criminal
punishments, it is no wonder that the "role of local governments in
the [NSW] Program has become very significant."'" Simply put, if not
for municipalities doing the state's work, North Carolina would not
be able to comply with the NSW Program's requirements. The North
Carolina state legislature was the entity that signed on to the NSW
Program, yet it is the municipalities that are actually doing all of the
legwork. The defendant-city was right to argue in Jennings that the
extensive state regulation and oversight of municipal storm drains
means that municipalities are, in effect, performing a function on
behalf of the state-an activity that would receive immunity.
62
Despite the EPA's extensive regulation, the opinion in Jennings
did not place any weight on this argument. Rather, it relied on the
fact that Kizer had also been decided after the EPA first began
regulating storm drains in the 1970s, and the Kizer court had still held
that operating storm drains was not a governmental function.63
According to Jennings, "our Supreme Court has not overturned or
modified this Court's holding in Kizer, and we are bound by its
holding that municipalities do not enjoy governmental immunity from
liability resulting from their operation of storm drain systems."' In
other words, the Jennings court did not consider the EPA regulation
argument to be important simply because it had no effect on Kizer's
outcome. Rather, the reason that Kizer had seemed to ignore this
argument is that no defendant-city had previously argued it before a
court, likely because the EPA has not imposed such extensive
regulations until the last few years.65 In fact, the defendant-city in
61. Dodson & Maske, supra note 34, § 2.4.2.
62. Defendant-Appellant's Brief to the Court of Appeals at 11-12, Jennings v. City of
Fayetteville,__ N.C. App. -, 680 S.E.2d 757, discretionary review denied, 363 N.C. 654,
684 S.E.2d 891 (2009) (No. COA09-92).
63. Jennings v. City of Fayetteville, _ N.C. App -... 680 S.E.2d 757, 760,
discretionary review denied, 363 N.C. 654, 684 S.E.2d 891 (2009).
64. Id.
65. See Dodson & Maske, supra note 34, §§ 2.3, 2.4.2. Seeking discretionary review by
the Supreme Court of North Carolina, the defendant-city in Jennings argued that the court
of appeals should not have relied on Kizer because there was no evidence that the
defendant-city in Kizer had even argued that EPA regulation was a factor. Petition for
Discretionary Review at 4, Jennings, - N.C. App. __, 680 S.E.2d 757 (No. COA09-92).
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court of North Carolina apparently found "this ingenious
argument unpersuasive," Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602 (1980), and denied
discretionary review to the defendant-city in Jennings. Jennings, 363 N.C. 654, 684 S.E.2d
891 (2009).
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Jennings seems to be the first case in the country where a municipality
argued that extensive EPA regulation of storm drains could result in
the operation of storm drains becoming a governmental function,
regardless of how it might have been classified in the past.6
Given North Carolina's recent extensive regulations and harsh
punishments for violating the EPA rules, the Jennings court should
have considered that the operation of storm drains no longer affects
just citizens within a municipality's city limits. Indeed, the EPA and
the North Carolina legislature would not have adopted such
regulations if storm drain run-off were not a state- and nation-wide
problem that could be effectively solved only through municipal
action.67 Because municipalities are performing this important public
duty on behalf of the state, they should be entitled to immunity.'
C. Comparing Storm Drains and Sewers
The conclusion in Jennings that storm drains do not enjoy
immunity is peculiar, given the ample evidence supporting the
similarity between storm drains and their immune cousin, sewers.69
Providing sewers is something that is usually done solely for the
public benefit of removing waste, rather than to generate a profit for
the municipality itself.7" It seems highly unlikely that any private
entity would be able to construct and maintain a sewer system due to
the large service area and difficulty of obtaining rights to the land
66. A search of Lexis state cases revealed no other opinions discussing the NSW and
municipal liability resulting from storm drains.
67. See generally Dodson & Maske, supra note 34, § 2 (noting states' heavy reliance
on municipalities to carry out storm drain construction and operation).
68. See Millar v. Town of Wilson, 222 N.C. 340, 341,23 S.E.2d 42,43 (1942).
69. See Metz v. City of Asheville, 150 N.C. 748, 752, 64 S.E. 881, 883 (1909) ("[T]he
establishment of a public sewer system is an exercise of a governmental function."); Roach
v. City of Lenoir, 44 N.C. App. 608, 610, 261 S.E.2d 299, 300-01 (1980) ("The
establishment and construction of a sewer system by a municipality are governmental
functions entitling it to immunity from negligence."). But see Pulliam v. City of
Greensboro, 103 N.C. App. 748, 753-54, 407 S.E.2d 567, 569-70 (1991) (arguing that
sewers are not governmental functions because there is some private competition for
waste removal and because there is a general trend toward reducing immunity wherever
the case is doubtful). But note that cases since Pulliam have backed away from the idea
that sovereign immunity should be limited wherever possible. See, e.g., Hewett v. County
of Brunswick, __ N.C. App. -, , 681 S.E.2d 531, 535 (2009) (holding that a county-
operated junk service's mistaken destruction and removal of a citizen's barn was protected
by governmental immunity, even though junk removal was a service provided extensively
by private entities).
70. Metz, 150 N.C. at 752, 64 S.E. at 883 ("Certainly, nothing is more necessary to the
health of a city than that its filth should be removed and its area well drained.").
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through which the pipes must traverse.71 Additionally, sewers
certainly fit under the governmental function category of removing
waste and junk.72 As such, sewers are a prototypical example of
something that a municipality engages in "solely for the public
benefit."73
Merriam-Webster does not define "storm drain," choosing
instead to combine storm drains and sanitary sewers into a single
definition under "sewer."74 This is certainly reasonable, given that
storm drains carry away refuse: "[A]s stormwater collects and flows
over pavements, lawns, driveways, and other urban surfaces, it often
picks up considerable quantities of pollutants, such as oil and grease,
fertilizers, pesticides, and metals."75 Indicating that storm water
typically is funneled through a system of conduits (like sewage), the
Supreme Court of North Carolina defined storm water as "rain or
snowmelt that does not evaporate or penetrate the ground and is
collected by storm drains that transport it to receiving waters."76
Further buttressing the argument that storm drains and sewers
are similar in function and purpose is the fact that many older cities
even use the exact same pipes and treatment centers for both sewage
and storm water.77 Such systems are called "Combined Sewer
Systems" and carry "sewage under dry weather conditions, but [are]
surcharged with runoff under storm conditions."78 Newer municipal
systems separate sewage from storm water because of the large
volume of run-off water generated during large storms, which would
overwhelm treatment centers.79 Additionally, sewage and storm drain
71. See McLean v. Town of Mooresville, 237 N.C. 498, 500, 75 S.E.2d 327, 328 (1953)
(noting that municipalities have the right to "condemn an easement for drainage
purposes"). The City of Charlotte has so many storm easements that it has created a
website to handle all of its residents' questions. CITY OF CHARLOTTE & MECKLENBURG
COUNTY GOV'T, EASEMENTS, http://charmeck.org/stormwater/DrainageandFlooding/
Pages/Easements.aspx (last visited Aug. 24, 2010).
72. Hewett, - N.C. App. at -, 681 S.E.2d at 535.
73. Metz, 150 N.C. at 749, 64 S.E. at 882 (quoting Mcllheney v. City of Wilmington,
127 N.C. 146, 37 S.E. 187 (1889)).
74. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE, UNABRIDGED 2081 (1993) (defining "sewer" as "an artificial usually
subterranean conduit to carry off sewage and sometimes surface water (as from rainfall)")
(emphasis added).
75. Dodson & Maske, supra note 34, § 2.1.
76. Smith Chapel Baptist Church v. City of Durham, 350 N.C. 805, 807, 517 S.E.2d
874, 876 (1999).
77. Dodson & Maske, supra note 34, § 2.4.2; Duhigg, supra note 26.
78. Dodson & Maske, supra note 34, § 2.4.2.
79. Id.
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systems both frequently require the placement of an extensive system
of pipes and culverts."s
The central question remains: What differences are there
between sewers and storm drains that lead courts to provide
immunity for sewers but not for storm drains? Given that storm
drains and sewers both carry refuse water, cover expansive territories
of land, and are frequently installed and operated by local
governments, there does not seem to be a clear reason why storm
drains and sewers are not grouped together for the purposes of
immunity. Indeed, many Supreme Court of North Carolina opinions
do not even differentiate between sanitary sewers and storm drains,
choosing instead to label them with terms like "municipal storm
sewer systems '"" or "the city's system of storm sewers." 82
D. Operating Storm Drains Is Not Proprietary
Because municipal service provision must be either
governmental or proprietary, the argument that the operation of
storm drains is governmental is bolstered by the evidence that
operating storm drains is not a proprietary function. In particular,
municipalities are statutorily prevented from turning a profit on their
operation of storm drain systems, even though municipalities are
allowed to charge a fee for the service.83 The turning of a profit is
crucial when determining whether an activity is proprietary or not:
municipalities have both corporate and governmental elements, and
profit-seeking is seen as indicative of the municipality's corporate
personality-for which immunity is not afforded."
80. See generally Mays, supra note 26, § 1.3 (noting that typical drainage systems
include an interconnected system of gutters, culverts, drains, streets, streams, floodways,
detention ponds, and pipes used to carry rain and snow melt to treatment plants or
receiving waters); McLean v. Town of Mooresville, 237 N.C. 498, 500, 75 S.E.2d 327, 328
(1953) (noting that a municipality had statutory authority "to condemn an easement for
drainage purposes").
81. Smith Chapel, 350 N.C. at 807, 517 S.E.2d at 876; see also Matternes v. City of
Winston-Salem, 286 N.C. 1, 15, 209 S.E.2d 481, 489 (1974) (using the phrase "storm sewer
drainage system").
82. Mosseller v. Asheville, 267 N.C. 104, 108, 147 S.E.2d 558, 561 (1966).
83. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-314(a) (2009) (allowing municipalities to "establish and
revise from time to time schedules of rents, rates, fees, charges, and penalties for the use of
or the services furnished by any public enterprise").
84. Evans v. Hous. Auth., 359 N.C. 50, 53, 602 S.E.2d 668, 670 (2004) ("[W]hen a
municipal corporation undertakes functions beyond its governmental and police powers
and engages in business in order to render a public service for the benefit of the
community for a profit, it becomes subject to liability for contract and in tort as in case of
private corporations." (quoting Town of Grimesland v. City of Washington, 234 N.C. 117,
123, 66 S.E.2d 794, 798 (1951))).
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One element that courts consider when determining whether an
action is proprietary is whether the city charged a fee: "A fee suggests
that an activity is proprietary, particularly if a profit results." 5
However, charging a fee is merely a weak consideration, since the
state legislature has authorized municipalities to charge fees for
certain activities that are typically considered governmental
functions.86 For instance, the Supreme Court of North Carolina
refused to label as proprietary the City of Charlotte's fee-based
collection of garbage where the fee merely covered the city's costs.87
Unlike the mere charging of a fee, the fact that a municipality actually
turns a profit is considered to be "strong evidence that the activity is
proprietary,"88 which makes sense given that the purpose of most
private businesses and corporations is to make a profit.
The profit element is especially relevant to storm drains because
the state legislature requires that "[r]ates, fees, and charges imposed
under this subsection may not exceed the city's cost of providing a
stormwater management program and a structural and natural
stormwater and drainage system."8 9 In 1999 the Supreme Court of
North Carolina held that the City of Durham had exceeded its
statutory authority when it charged its residents a fee that allowed the
city to turn a profit on its storm water system.9" The legal inability to
even try to turn a profit dictates that maintaining storm drains is not
an activity that any private business or corporation would
undertake-which is the textbook definition of a proprietary
activity.91
This profit ban is especially significant because municipalities do
not receive funding from the state despite the ever-increasing duties
for municipalities to maintain their storm drains under federal and
85. Id. at 54, 602 S.E.2d at 671 (citations omitted).
86. Id. at 55, 602 S.E.2d at 671; Schmidt v. Breeden, 134 N.C. App. 248, 255, 517
S.E.2d 171, 174-75 (1999) (holding that the operation of a school daycare that charged a
self-sustaining fee was not a proprietary function).
87. James v. City of Charlotte, 183 N.C. 630, 632, 112 S.E. 423, 424 (1922); see also
Koontz v. City of Winston-Salem, 280 N.C. 513, 528-29, 186 S.E.2d 897, 907-08 (1972)
(holding that city engaged in a governmental function when it charged a fee to cover
operating a landfill for disposal of garbage but still allowing recovery based on nuisance).
88. Willett v. Chatham County Bd. of Educ., 176 N.C. App. 268, 270, 625 S.E.2d 900,
902 (2006) (quoting Hare v. Butler, 99 N.C. App. 693, 699, 394 S.E.2d 231, 235 (1990)).
89. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-314(al)(2) (2009).
90. Smith Chapel Baptist Church v. City of Durham, 350 N.C. 805, 815, 517 S.E,2d
874, 881 (1991).
91. Evans, 359 N.C. at 53, 602 S.E.2d at 670 ("[W]hen a municipal corporation
undertakes functions beyond its governmental and police powers and engages in business
in order to render a public service for the benefit of the community for a profit, it becomes
subject to liability for contract and in tort as in case of private corporations.").
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state laws.' Due to the state's decisions to prohibit profits and to
refuse to cover municipalities' costs, storm drains have become
money pits93 that no business would dare engage in. Therefore, the
operation of storm drains cannot easily be characterized as a
proprietary function, which only adds additional weight to the
argument that such activity fits well within the Supreme Court of
North Carolina's definitions of a governmental function.94
III. THE HISTORICAL REFUSAL TO GRANT DAMAGES FOR
PERSONAL INJURY
Historically, North Carolina courts have been willing to hold
municipalities liable for property damages even when the
municipality engaged in a governmental activity.95 However, many of
these cases specifically excluded from recovery all personal injury or
wrongful death damages. 96 Therefore, Jennings exceeded precedent
when it allowed recovery for wrongful death.97
92. See supra Part II.B.
93. See Duhigg, supra note 26 (noting that Philadelphia is planning to spend $1.6
billion to improve storm water run-off, that New York City would have to spend $58
billion to prevent all illegal storm water discharges from occurring, and that it would cost
$400 billion to fix the nation's sewer and storm drain infrastructure).
94. See supra Part II.A.
95. See Milner Hotels, Inc. v. City of Raleigh, 268 N.C. 535, 537, 151 S.E.2d 35, 37
(1966); Metz v. City of Asheville, 150 N.C. 748, 751, 64 S.E. 881, 882 (1909); Williams v.
Town of Greenville, 130 N.C. 93, 97, 40 S.E. 977, 978 (1902); Stone v. City of Fayetteville,
3 N.C. App. 261, 264, 164 S.E.2d 542, 545 (1968).
96. Metz, 150 N.C. at 751, 64 S.E. at 882; Williams, 130 N.C. at 97, 40 S.E. at 978;
Stone, 3 N.C. App. at 264, 164 S.E.2d at 545. Going even further than Metz, Williams, and
Stone, the 1980 court of appeals case Roach v. City of Lenoir refused to allow recovery
even for property damages resulting from negligent operation of a sewer system:
The establishment and construction of a sewer system by a municipality are
governmental functions entitling it to immunity from negligence. Plaintiffs
concede in their brief that "... the maintenance of a public sewerage system is a
governmental function[.]" ... Plaintiffs argue that even if the doctrine of
governmental immunity is applicable, property damages are recoverable [under a
claim of nuisance].... We do not agree. The case sub judice is distinguishable
since plaintiffs neither allege facts sufficient to support a nuisance claim nor is
their claim based on a theory of nuisance. Thus, the City of Lenoir, while
performing a governmental function in the maintenance of a sewer system within
its municipal jurisdiction, may not be held liable for any damage arising out of the
governmental activity unless it expressly waives its immunity pursuant to N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 160A-485.
Roach v. City of Lenoir, 44 N.C. App. 608, 610, 261 S.E.2d 299, 300-01 (1980 (first
alteration in original)) (citations omitted).
97. Jennings v. City of Fayetteville, _ N.C. App .... 680 S.E.2d 757, 760,
discretionary review denied, 363 N.C. 654, 684 S.E.2d 891 (2009).
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The seminal North Carolina storm drain case is Williams v. Town
of Greenville.9 8 In Williams, the defendant-town had cut a drainage
ditch near the plaintiff's property, but the ditch was constructed
negligently.99 As a result, the ditch became
so choked and out of repair that in time of heavy rains it would
not carry the water that came down the ditch; [and] ...
defendant had allowed the open ditch to become the depository
that of dead fowls and dead animals until it produced a stench
both disagreeable and unhealthy ... "
The plaintiff's home "became unhealthy, two of his children became
sick and died," and the plaintiff "suffered great pain and anguish of
mind[,] ... lost much time in nursing [his children,] ... and he had
"101large doctor's bills and drug bills to pay ....
The Supreme Court of North Carolina reasoned that
governmental immunity applied to all actions of the defendant-town
that were made in "pursuance of its legislative or judicial powers,"
except when the municipality's actions damage the rights of property
ownership, which "no one has the right to invade, not even the
Government, unless it be for public purposes, and then only by
paying the owner for it." 102 As such, the court drew a bright-line rule
when it held that the defendant-town
may be held to answer in damages as for a trespass, for any
damages the plaintiff may have sustained to his property by
reason of the wrongful action of the defendant; but not for any
sickness that may have been caused to him or his family; nor
can he recover damage for his time, the increase in expenses of
his family, nor for doctors' bills or medicines .... 103
In Metz v. City of Asheville," the Supreme Court of North
Carolina once again applied the Williams rule, this time in the context
of sewers. Metz involved an administrator who sued the defendant-
city when a resident died after contracting typhoid fever from sewer
refuse that drained near his house."' Relying on Williams, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the defendant-city was
98. 130 N.C. 93,40 S.E. 977 (1902).
99. Id. at 93-94,40 S.E. at 977.
100. Id. at 93,40 S.E. at 977.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 96,40 S.E. at 978.
103. Id. at 97,40 S.E. at 978.
104. 150 N.C. 748, 64 S.E. 881 (1909).
105. Id. at 749, 64 S.E. at 881.
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"liable only for damages to the property, not for bills of physicians,
increase in expenses of his family, loss of time or mental anguish."1 °6
The trend of refusing to allow recovery for personal injury
continued in North Carolina well into the twentieth century. A 1930
supreme court case reaffirmed Metz,"°7 and in the 1968 case of Stone
v. City of Fayetteville,1°8 the North Carolina Court of Appeals
summarized the applicable precedent:
Thus it appears that while our Supreme Court recognizes the
right of recovery against a municipal corporation for property
damage on the theory that one whose property is appropriated
for public purposes is entitled to just compensation therefor, it
recognizes immunity of a municipal corporation from liability
for personal injury or death arising from the maintenance of a
ditch used for drainage and sewerage.1°9
By allowing recovery for wrongful death, Jennings went beyond
the still-standing supreme court precedent in Williams and Metz and
even disregarded its own ruling in Stone, which ironically had dealt
with the same defendant-city as in Jennings."' Therefore, a thorough
study of North Carolina precedent like Williams,"' Metz,"1 2 and
Stone113 indicates that municipalities should be afforded governmental
immunity when their operation of storm drains results in personal
106. Id. at 751, 64 S.E. at 882. The Metz court also noted the New York Court of
Appeals case of Springfield Fire and Marine Insurance Co. v. Village of Keeseville, 42 N.E.
405, 408 (N.Y. 1895), where the court refused to allow damages for personal injury after
the municipality had negligently operated a waterworks system in an attempt to extinguish
a fire. The Keeseville decision was reached on financial grounds: "[C]ases have arisen, and
may still arise, where an extensive conflagration might bankrupt the municipality, if it
could be rendered liable for the damages or losses sustained." Id. at 406. Metz also noted
the even harsher decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Buckley v. City
of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 201, 202 (Mass. 1891), which refused to allow damages even
where the defendant-city had created a nuisance. Metz, 150 N.C. at 751-52, 64 S.E. at 882.
107. Wagner v. Conover, 200 N.C. 82, 84, 156 S.E. 167, 168 (1930) (holding that the
noxious fumes emanating from a sewer could be factored into damages only to the extent
that the fumes lowered the value of the property itself).
108. 3 N.C. App. 261, 164 S.E.2d 542 (1968). The disagreement between Stone and
Kizer was even pointed out in a North Carolina tort treatise: "Maintenance of a storm
drainage system has been the subject of conflicting rulings in the Court of Appeals as to
whether it is an immune governmental or a non-immune proprietary function." CHARLES
E. DAYE & MARK W. MORRIS, NORTH CAROLINA LAW OF TORTS § 19.43.3.2.2 (2d ed.
1999).
109. Stone, 3 N.C. App. at 264, 164 S.E.2d at 545.
110. The City of Fayetteville was the defendant in both cases. Id.; Jennings v. City of
Fayetteville, - N.C. App. -. , 680 S.E.2d 757 (2009).
111. Williams v. Town of Greenville, 130 N.C. 93, 97, 40 S.E. 977, 978 (1902).
112. Metz v. City of Asheville, 150 N.C. 748, 751, 64 S.E. 881,882 (1909).
113. Stone, 3 N.C. App. at 264, 164 S.E.2d at 545.
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injury. Allowing recovery for a wrongful death claim in Jennings was
not in accord with 100 years of precedent.'
14
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Storm drain liability may seem to be a dry subject, but a case like
Jennings could certainly have a large financial impact on the behavior
of municipalities, who are already facing limited budgets.'15 One only
needs to look at recent news reports to find a multitude of deaths
caused by storm flooding,116 any one of which could lead the
decedent's estate to file suit against the city or county. Extensive
litigation resulting from extant drains could threaten municipality
budgets, which, as previously described, are already under increased
storm water costs thanks to ever-increasing EPA and state
regulations.'17
There are numerous examples of the problems caused by storm
drain costs that face large cities, many of which already have
expansive budgets. Minneapolis has fifteen miles of storm water
tunnels that are badly outdated, some of which are more than 100
years old and were constructed before the days of reinforced
114. Jennings relied heavily upon the conclusion of Kizer, which said that a study of
supreme court precedent indicated overwhelming evidence for recovery of damages
resulting from storm drains. Kizer v. City of Raleigh, 121 N.C. App. 526, 528, 466 S.E.2d
336, 338 (1996) ("[P]rior Supreme Court decisions find municipal liability in storm drain
maintenance cases."). As such, the court of appeals felt tethered to Kizer's broad holding.
Jennings, - N.C. App. at __, 680 S.E.2d at 760 ("[O]ur Supreme Court has not
overturned or modified this Court's holding in Kizer, and we are bound by its holding that
municipalities do not enjoy governmental immunity from liability resulting from their
operation of storm drain systems."). However, Kizer actually dealt only with property
damages, Kizer, 121 N.C. App. at 527, 466 S.E.2d at 337, and thus its holding was not
binding on the court of appeals above the Williams and Stone decisions.
115. See NAT'L GOVERNORS ASS'N & NAT'L ASS'N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS,
supra note 2, at 1; Winter, supra note 2 (noting that forty-eight states have cut their budget
allowances for dealing with environmental clean-up regulations, many of which are
promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency).
116. See, e.g., Kate Brumback, 9 Southeastern Storm Deaths as Floodwaters Linger,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 23, 2009 (discussing details of eight Georgians and one
Alabamian who were killed by storm water flooding); Mike Lee, Fort Worth Grapples with
Flood Control, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Aug. 18, 2009, at B1 (noting that an
eighty-year-old storm drain was so outdated that rainfall could yield five feet of water in
the city of Fort Worth, and mentioning that several residents died in 2004 when storm
drains overflowed); 3-year-old Dies After Falling into Ditch, ABC11-WTVD, Feb. 17,
2010, http://abclocal.go.comlwtvd/story?section=news/local&id=7280842 (last visited Aug.
24, 2010) (noting that a three-year old had wandered away from home and drowned in a
drainage ditch).
117. See supra Part II.B.
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concrete. 118 The force of the water in some tunnels has caused
manhole covers to blow off and geysers to flood the nearby streets.1 19
Streets and buildings are at risk of collapsing into sinkholes, but the
city only has but so much money. It would cost $75 million to repair
those fifteen miles of tunnels, but the annual repair budget is only $2
million. z2 Even trying to repair the tight tunnels has its risks: two
workers drowned in July 2008 when a sudden deluge caught them off
guard. 12 ' New York City claims that it would cost $58 billion to repair
all of its storm and sewer pipes, which would result in residents' water
bills nearly doubling.12 Philadelphia will spend $1.6 billion over the
next twenty years just to create sidewalks and green areas that can
better absorb rainwater.123 These cities are just a few examples, but
they are not the exception: the estimate for bringing the nation's
drains up to code is put at $400 billion over the next ten years. 2 4
For cities with budgets smaller than those of New York and
Philadelphia, the outcome in Jennings is an example of how municipal
budgets are already stretched so thin that the costs of a single
wrongful death suit could exceed the amount spent annually to repair
the storm drain system.12 5 The average wrongful death award in the
United States from April 1998 to April 2008 was $3,448,917 for an
adult male, 26 $2,990,032 for an adult female, 27 and $5,176,519 for a
minor. 28
118. David Shaffer, A Threat Builds Deep Beneath the Twin Cities, STAR TRIBUNE
(Minneapolis), Feb. 17, 2008, at 1A.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Duhigg, supra note 26.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. However, there are still ways for municipalities to avoid or limit their liability
even under the current rule of Jennings. For instance, municipalities may still be able to
avoid paying damages by arguing contributory or comparative negligence on the part of
the plaintiff, especially since more than half of all flood deaths occur when people try to
drive cars through flooded areas. Storm-Related Mortality-Central Texas, October 17-31,
1998, MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. (Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, U.S. Dep't Health & Hum. Services, Wash., D.C.), Feb. 25, 2000, at 133-35.
Municipalities could also argue that a reasonable standard of care would not be able to
avoid deaths caused by torrential floods, and, thus, there was no breach of duty.
Municipalities can limit total expenditures on storm drain liability by purchasing insurance
in the case of property damage or personal injury resulting from their negligence. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 160A-485 (2009). Municipalities could also seek to avoid some litigation by
requiring users of storm drains to sign contracts prohibiting suit in the case of damages.
See Smith v. City of Winston-Salem, 247 N.C. 349, 355, 100 S.E.2d 835, 839 (1957).
126. JURY VERDICT RESEARCH, INC., 4 PERSONAL INJURY VALUATION HANDBOOK
§ 10.5, at 7 tbl. "Adult Males, Overall" (2008).
2290 [Vol. 88
2010] LOST IMMUNITY FOR STORM DRAINS 2291
One could argue that if municipalities are given immunity for
storm drains, they may feel that they have no incentive to improve
the drains since there will be no punishment when property or lives
are lost due to the negligent operation or construction of the drains.
However, given the extensive regulations now in place per the EPA
guidelines, municipalities do actually have an incentive to improve
their storm drains for the purpose of avoiding flooding and excessive
discharges, under penalty of severe civil and criminal punishments. 129
Imposing additional civil liability may just eat away at town treasuries
and result in fewer funds to bring drains up to code. 130
On the other hand, cases like Jennings allow families who have
lost loved ones to seek compensation. Concededly, there will indeed
be many circumstances where injured parties will be left
uncompensated, which certainly is not a very savory outcome for the
families. However, an important effect of immunity is that
governments can undertake necessary activities without the risk of
being bankrupted by litigation,13 which could result in the citizens of
an entire town being left without essential services. This is the
necessary trade-off of providing immunity. Rather than arguing the
fairness and viability of sovereign immunity, 132  this Recent
Development assumes that immunity will remain a legal tenet in
127. Id. § 20.5, at 5 tbl. "Adult Females, Overall."
128. Id. § 30.5, at 3 tbl. "Awards for Minors, Overall."
129. See supra Part lI.B.
130. See Duhigg, supra note 26 ("Plant operators and regulators, for their part, say that
fines would simply divert money from stretched budgets and that they are doing the best
they can with aging systems and overwhelmed pipes.").
131. See Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Village of Keeseville, 42 N.E. 405, 406
(N.Y. 1895).
132. Some commentators have argued that sovereign immunity in any situation is
repulsive to our ideal that a government should be answerable to its citizens. See
DOERNBERG, supra note 8, passim. Even in the early 1970s, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina noted:
[W]e recognize merit in the modern tendency to restrict rather than to extend the
application of governmental immunity. This trend is based, inter alia, on the large
expansion of municipal activities, the availability of liability insurance, and the
plain injustice of denying relief to an individual injured by the wrongdoing of a
municipality. A corollary to the tendency of modern authorities to restrict rather
than to extend the application of governmental immunity is the rule that in cases
of doubtful liability application of the rule should be resolved against the
municipality.
Koontz v. City of Winston-Salem, 280 N.C. 513, 529-30, 186 S.E.2d 897, 908 (1972). But
see Hewett v. County of Brunswick, - N.C. App. -, -, 681 S.E.2d 531, 535-36 (2009)
(holding that a county-operated junk service's mistaken destruction and removal of a
citizen's barn was protected by sovereign immunity, even though junk removal was a
service provided extensively by private entities).
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North Carolina for some time into the future and that the delineation
of immune actions from non-immune actions will continue to be
decided by courts employing a governmental/proprietary distinction.
CONCLUSION
As North Carolina law currently stands, municipalities have no
immunity for their operation of storm drains, despite ample
precedent that had severely restricted liability resulting from the
negligent operation of storm drains. Given that (1) storm drains fit
into precedential definitions of government functions, (2) the state
and EPA extensively regulate storm drains with severe punishments
for violations, (3) storm drains are remarkably similar to sewers, and
(4) municipalities are statutorily forbidden from turning a profit on
their operation of storm drains, there is a long train of arguments all
tending invariably toward the same conclusion: the operation of
storm drains should be afforded governmental immunity. Yet to be
seen is whether Jennings will leave municipalities up the creek
without a paddle if the floodgates of storm drain litigation burst open,
or if Jennings will (in the permuted words of Justice Frankfurter)
languish as a "derelict on the law of the waters." '133
TRENT McCoTI'ER
133. Justice Frankfurter's original quote was "a derelict on the waters of the law,"
implying that the majority's opinion would not be followed by future courts. Lambert v.
California, 355 U.S. 225, 232 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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